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ADDRESS
LEGAL ETHICS: LEGAL RULES AND
PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
HE BAR IS NOW GENERALLY AWARE that a revised set of Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct has been proposed to, and is being considered by,
the American Bar Association.1 These proposed Model Rules, if endorsed
by the ABA, will be presented for adoption in the several states. If
adopted in a state, the Model Rules would replace the present Code of
Professional Responsibility.
I. LEGAL RULES
A key initial question is whether the bar really needs a comprehen-
sively revised set of rules, as distinct from revisions of the present
Code. The answer is clearly "yes." My own belief in this regard may be
colored by the fact that I am Reporter to the ABA Commission on Eval-
uation of Professional Standards (the "Kutak Commission"), which
drafted the proposed Rules. However, the case for adopting the Model
Rules as a whole is overwhelming, even if one disagrees with the resolu-
tion in the Model Rules of certain necessarily controversial issues If
there are different views on such issues, the solution is to adopt the
Model Rules while modifying their resolution. Thus, the case for com-
prehensive revision goes beyond the merits of specific issues dealt with
in the new Model Rules.
The point, very simply, is that comprehensive revision is required
because the structure of the present Code has turned out to be
* Deputy Dean, Professor of Law and Management, Yale School of Organiza-
tion and Management, and Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
' See Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the
'80s and Beyond, 67 A.B.A.J. 1116 (1981); ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards, Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 67
A.B.A.J. 1298 (Additum 1981) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules].
2 For example, consider the issue of whether trial counsel who knows that his
client is committing perjury is required to do anything about it. See generally
Wolfram, Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial
Lawyers on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 964.
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disasterous. This is not the fault of the Code's draftsmen, but is the
result of subsequent developments in interpretation of the Code. The
essence of the problem lies in the present Code's three-level structure.
The components of the three-level structure are as follows: At the
most general level are nine Canons, drafted in very broad language. For
example, Canon 4 says that: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences
and secrets of a client."3 Canon 6 says that: "A lawyer should represent
a client competently."' Canon 9 says that: "A lawyer should avoid even
the appearance of impropriety."5 The second level in the Code consists
of Ethical Considerations. These are much more specific than the
Canons. However, like the Canons, they are written in precatory
language (using the word "should") rather than language of obligation
("shall"). For example, with regard to conflicts of interest, EC 5-15
states as follows: "If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue
representaton of multiple clients having potentially differing interests,
he . .. should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representa-
tion."' With regard to competence, EC 6-3 says that "a lawyer generally
should not accept employment in any area of the law in which he is not
qualified."7
The third level consists of Disciplinary Rules, written in black letter
and using the term "shall" in stating obligations. For example, DR
7-102(A)(4) provides that a lawyer "shall not knowingly make a false
statement of law or fact,"8 and DR 4-101(C) provides that a lawyer "may
reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime ... "9
The original conception of the Code was that the first two levels-
Canons and Ethical Consideratons-were to be aspirational standards,
and that only the Disciplinary Rules were obligatory."0 Thus, it was in-
tended that the Code retain the ethical aspirational character of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics of 1908, which the Code replaced, but add
rules of law in black letter.
This original conception of the Code was an intelligent ex-
periment-ari attempt to legislate rules of minimum conduct while at
the same time expounding higher principles of professional ethics. But
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 4.
Id. at No. 6.
Id at No. 9.
0 ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1980).
Id at EC 6-3.
Id. at DR 7-102(A)(4).
0 Id. at DR 4-101(C).
,0 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979), in which it
is stated that "[tihe Cannons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers.... The
Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character.... The Disciplinary Rules,
unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character." Id. at 1.
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the experiment has turned out to be a failure, with very adverse conse-
quences for the practicing lawyer.
What has happened is that the Canons and the Ethical Considera-
tions-although supposed to be only aspirational-have been relied on
by courts and disciplinary committees as though they were black letter
rules. This reliance has occurred in disciplinary proceedings and in
other contexts such as malpractice suits against lawyers and motions to
disqualify on the ground of conflict of interest. The result is that the
present Code has come to contain at least two potential rules governing
the same lawyer conduct (and sometimes three potential rules)."
Three examples may be given of this legal double-speak under the
Code. First, regarding the lawyer's obligation to serve a client diligently,
the black letter of the Code, DR 6-101(A)(3), says that a lawyer shall not
"neglect a matter entrusted to him."1 2 This standard implies at most a re-
quirement that a lawyer use the diligence that a reasonably careful
lawyer would use, and may imply that a lawyer violates the rule only
through conscious or willful neglect. On the other hand, it has been held
in decisions that the proper standard for assessing diligence is Canon 7,
which states that "A lawyer should represent a client zealously .... ,13 The
term "zeal" implies all-out effort so that a lawyer could be said to violate
the Code if he gives anything less than such an effort.
The second example is the standard for avoiding conflicts of in-
terest-the circumstances in which a lawyer must decline a new matter
because of previous representation of another client. Under DR 5-105(A),
the lawyer may accept the new matter unless "his professional judgment
• . . reasonably may be affected ... "" On the other hand, there are
holdings that the proper standard is Canon 9, so that a lawyer may not ac-
cept a new matter if it will involve "the appearance of impropriety."'5
A third example concerns the circumstances under which a lawyer
must reveal to the court that perjured evidence has been presented, par-
ticularly perjury by his client. Under the present Code it is plausible to
conclude that any of the following is the rule: that the lawyer must reveal
the perjury by reason of DR 7-102(B)1) and the requirement under
Canon 7 that he act "within the bounds of the law""; that he may reveal
the perjury by reason of DR 4-101(C)(3) and the requirement of Canon 9
that he avoid the "appearance of impropriety""; and that he may not
" For a detailed analysis, see Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad v.
Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1386 (1980). See also Hazard, Rules of
Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 THE RECORD 77 (1981); Moser, The Model
Rules: Is One Format Better Than Another?, 67 A.B.A.J. 1624 (1981).
12 ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1980).
'3 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7.
" ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1980).
II ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9.
Id. at No. 7.
Id. at No. 9.
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reveal it by reason of DR 4-101(B) and Canon 4 stating that "[a] lawyer
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."'8
Let us be quite clear about the significance of these examples. They
are examples of problems that arise in the ordinary practice of law; they
are not exotic fortuities or academic exercises. Furthermore, they pre-
sent lawyers with very strongly conflicting inclinations and hence en-
tail inherently tough decisions. And the Code as interpreted resolves
each of these problems in two different ways simultaneously.
The double-speak of the Code cannot be cured by amendment. It
results from the Code's very structure, that is, by its attempt to speak
simultaneously about rules of aspiration and rules of obligation.
In contrast, the proposed Model Rules are cast in the familar and
much more reliable form of the restatements. Accordingly, on any given
subject, the Model Rules provide a black letter rule and an explanatory
comment. The Rules, in other words, seek to be rules of the lawyer's
legal obligations and not expressions of hope as to what a lawyer ought
to do.
The practicing lawyer needs and is entitled to legal rules that are not
confounded by appeals for moral regeneration. The practice of law is
technically and morally a difficult task. Technically, law practice is dif-
ficult because the law is complicated-as every practitioner is aware.
Morally, law practice is difficult because the lawyer generally works at
the edge of legal rights and wrongs. There is no getting around this
moral peril. The law itself-the stuff lawyers work with-defines legal
rights and wrongs.
A lawyer should not have to operate under inherent moral peril with
a rule system that is inherently ambiguous. But that is his situation
under the present Code as it has come to be interpreted. That is why
the new Model Rules are preferable to the Code, quite apart from how
substantive issues of professional conduct might be resolved.
II. PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS
While the legal profession requires rules of professional conduct that
are unequivocally legal rules, it also needs to project high professional
aspirations. Professor Murray Schwartz has developed some of the im-
plications of this need.'9 He observes that the proposed Model Rules
abandon any attempt to state aspirational norms and limit themselves
to being law. Professor Schwartz approves this approach but points out
that it also leaves a large vacuum. This is the same vacuum that the
Wright committee noticed, that is, both Professor Schwartz and the
Code realize that we can formulate legal rules for professional deport-
Id at No. 4.
See generally Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 953.
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ment, but would also like to say something in the way of guidance or in-
spiration or aspiration about how lawyers could and fittingly should
deport themselves in the large domains of professional conduct that lie
within the boundaries of the law. In other words, the black letter pro-
vides a legal boundary beyond which a lawyer should not go, but there
remains a large area of permissive or discretionary conduct. In this area
some patterns of behavior are more commendable -more desirable,
more "professional"-than others. How are these commendable pat-
terns to be described and recommended?
The problem is how to talk about patterns of behavior so as to com-
mend some as preferable to others, without by implication condemning
the other as legally wrong. The Code tried to do this by using the word
"should" instead of the word "shall," but still employed the medium of
general propositions about behavior, e.g., "[a] lawyer should avoid even
the appearance of impropriety."'2 As indicated above, this attempt yielded
the adverse consequence that "should" often was interpreted to mean
"shall." That is, general propositions about appropriate behavior tend to
be converted into legal rules.
As a consequence, if the bar uses general propositions to speak about
desirable professional practice, it runs the risk of legislating in-
advertently. General normative propositions ("shoulds") are un-
avoidably vulnerable to transformation into legal rules ("shalls"). In
short, the medium of generalization is inappropriate to convey the
message of professional aspiration, as distinct from the message of legal
obligation.
But there are other media. The problem is to recognize that the form
in which we speak to express professional aspiration-the rhetoric-
ought to be different from the form of rhetoric in which we speak of
obligation.
There is ample precedent for another kind of rhetoric. The medium
that we could use for identifying exemplary behavior is the commend-
able, or honorific-or, if you will, heroic-example. Instead of trying to
describe exemplary conduct in general normative propositions-for ex-
ample, "avoid the appearance of impropriety" -we can give an illum-
inating instance where a lawyer has avoided the appearance of im-
propriety and then say: Do thou likewise.
If we reflect on our cultural tradition, we recognize immediately that
this is a classical form of normative instruction. The Old Testament is
full of ethical instruction cast in the form of illuminating anecdotes or in-
stances-the stories of David and of Solomon, for examples. These are
vivid "cases" drawn from life in which an actor's behavior is used to ex-
emplify a conduct that is commended or condemned, as the case may be.
In the Christian tradition, Jesus' teaching usually took this form. Jesus
occasionally invoked generalizations, for example, "love thy neighbor as
20 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9.
19821
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thyself." However, Jesus' principal vehicle was the specific case-the
good Samaritan, for instance. Over and over again, he presented ex-
amples of behavior that exemplified good conduct as he defined it and
sought to persuade others to accept.
A similar method is used in the Greek tradition. The Iliad and The
Odyssey are tales of exemplary conduct-again, either commended or
condemned-to illustrate and define the good or the bad or the foolish.
A similar teaching apparatus is exhibited by Aesop's fables.
There are many other illustrations of the use of this technique. In-
deed, much of biography, much of fiction, and much of poetry, consists of
education through illuminating example. In this technique, no effort is
made to define in precise - "legalistic" - terms what is good about the
conduct. Indeed, it is often left for the audience to deliberate about the
essence of the goodness, or badness, illustrated in the example.
Modern society uses the same technique. A Nobel Prize to a scientist
teaches what a good scientist is by singling out an exemplary case and
bestowing commendation, to the accompaniment of great public fanfare
and exposition of the feat. Even more directly relevant to lawyer's
ideals is the Nobel Peace Prize. The prize offered to Martin Luther
King, for example, teaches us how one person acted "zealously within
the bounds of the law," to borrow a phrase from our own ethical lore.
Conferring award for exemplary acts is a public pronouncement of that
which is desirable and esteemed.
The same sort of thing is done by professional groups, including the
bar. We confer awards and citations for professional excellence. A
similar process is involved in the selection of bar leaders on the basis of
professional standing, and in continuing legal education, where excellent
practitioners are invited to describe their technique.
These forms express aspirations. The medium is at least as evocative
and powerful as generalizations about goodness. Indeed, it may be more
so because it is not impeded by concern for technicality of definition. It
recognizes that education through example-with the invitation to
emulate-is a better means of evoking exemplary behavior than a penal
code.
The only problem with this technique is that is is not "legal." But this
only reminds us that in seeking to achieve ideal ethical behavior in our
profession we may have to use some technique other than legal control
as such. Legal rules, of course, have a place. The proposed Model Rules
testify to that. The point is simply that general normative propositions
have a limited place, and that we should not try to force them to use
beyond that place. I believe this is what we have done with the Canons
and Ethical Consideratons in the present Code.
I support the sentiment of those who wish somehow to continue the
aspirational aims of the Canons and Ethical Considerations. My argu-
ment is only that we are using the wrong medium if we try to do so in
rules, even if the rules are formulated in the terms of the verb "should."
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